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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The issue of farm data has been a contentious point of 
debate with respect to ownership rights and impacts 
when access rights are misappropriated. One of the 
leading questions farmers ask deals with the 
protections provided to farm data. Although no 
specific laws or precedence exists, the possibility of 
trade secret is examined and ramifications for damages 
discussed. Farm management examples are provided 
to emphasize the potential outcomes of each possible 
recourse for misappropriating farm data. 
Discussions of “big data” are common on the local 
and national news, in newspapers, and at the corner 
coffee shop or at gas stations in rural communities.  
“Big data” is the term applied to the massive volumes 
of information stored digitally on computers, servers, 
and clouds.   These data sets are large or complex, 
making traditional data processing applications largely 
inadequate. 
However, the concept of big data is much more than 
an immense amount of numbers. The information, 
when interpreted and applied, can help scientists, 
researchers, businesses, marketers, medical professionals, 
and governments understand and respond to local, 
national, and global issues.
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Combining each farmer’s data across a geographic region is 
generally considered “big data.”
The concept of big data in agriculture refers to 
aggregated farm data gathered from numerous farming 
operations into a single database or repository. For 
example, corn growers may collect site-specific 
geospatial and metadata (information which describes, 
explains, or locates data to make it easier to retrieve, 
use, or manage) across many acres.  Site-specific 
geospatial data may include as-applied seeding rates, 
soil nutrient information, and yield monitoring data. 
Metadata include the number of acres, and when, 
where, and which inputs were applied and 
cultivars planted.   
Combining each farmer’s data across a geographic 
region is generally considered “big data.” These data 
can be digitally shared with agricultural technology 
providers (ATPs), farmer cooperatives, policymakers, 
and many other public or private sector entities 
through a cloud-based system.  
There are significant concerns and risks, however, 
surrounding farm data.  History shows the law rarely 
keeps up with technology and farm data are no 
exception. Courts often struggle when applying existing 
laws and previous rulings to modern technology.  As 
of 2016, no existing laws cover farm data ownership 
or implications of misappropriation of that data. 
In this report, we consider farm data issues in the 
context of current laws pertaining to intellectual 
property and more specifically, trade secrets.  Case law 
and/or legislation are likely to be the deciding factor 
in determining the rights and protections associated 
with farm data.  State legislatures can help by clearly 
defining rules to guide courts in handling new 
technology (Goeringer et al., 2015).
Benefits of Big Agricultural Data Can 
Be Vast But Are Largely Unproven
Big farm data have the potential to assist in developing 
prescriptive planting programs, customized fertilizer 
and pesticide applications, hybrid seed selection, and 
much more.  In addition to farm and industry 
benefits, big farm data can potentially benefit 
society by enabling analysis of issues for the public 
good which may otherwise go unaddressed. 
Big farm data have the potential 
to assist in developing prescriptive 
planting programs, customized 
fertilizer and pesticide applications, 
hybrid seed selection, and 
much more.
Although improved societal welfare such as clean 
water and reduced pollution benefit everyone, ATPs 
and other private firms may not directly address these 
issues.  The availability of big farm data may allow 
public entities such as the land grant university system 
to address societal concerns. Data from best 
management practices for manure and waste, for 
example, may help researchers determine which 
practices best protect the health of waterways.  
Farm Data Can Be Intangible, Irreplaceable, 
Non-Rival, and Non-Excludable
Due to its digital nature, farm data are considered 
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as grain, livestock, machinery, and land, copies of digital 
data are identical to the original. Multiple entities may 
have access to copies of data--a very different scenario 
than farmers’ grain stored in an elevator.
Data are also irreplaceable. Farm-level data may not be 
recovered if there is a data transfer or equipment 
malfunction, unless a backup copy is available. Since 
data may be lost during manual transfer, wireless 
cellular communication systems such as telematics 
(information technology which enables long-distance 
transmission of computerized information) are 
increasingly favorable features. The market demand for 
data security to prevent data loss is growing. 
Data are also considered non-rival because one person 
accessing the data does not alter another person’s 
ability to use it (Griffin et al., 2016).  Reports on 
weather or spot commodity prices are classic 
agricultural examples of non-rival goods. 
The next logical question is whether data can be 
considered excludable or non-excludable (Griffin et 
al., 2016). Excludability depends on several factors 
such as whether the data was shared with a third-
party or within a community, and if ownership can be 
maintained. Excludable goods carry the owner’s right 
to deny access to others.  Most privately held goods 
are excludable. 
Privately held agricultural data can be excludable while solely in 
the possession of the party that generated it; however, once the 
data are shared with other parties or aggregated, excludability is 
eliminated, at least from the farmer’s perspective.
Commodity price data may be privately held and 
accessible only to subscribers rather than publicly 
available. When a government entity such as the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) reports commodity 
price data, it is a public good and so is non-excludable. 
Privately held agricultural data can be excludable 
while solely in the possession of the party that 
generated it; however, once the data are shared with 
other parties or aggregated, excludability is eliminated, 
at least from the farmer’s perspective.
Who Owns Farm Data Is Not Always Clear
What does ownership of data mean? Who owns the 
data an ATP gathers from a farm? Is it the farmer’s? 
Does the ATP now own it?  
FICO scores (credit score used by 90% of lenders) 
provide an analogy for considering farm data ownership. 
FICO scores range from 300 – 850, with the higher 
numbers (usually around 760 or higher) representing 
less risk to the lender or insurer. If an individual wants 
to finance the purchase of property, equipment, or even 
animals, the lender likely will obtain the person’s FICO 
score to evaluate their financial status.  
The FICO score is calculated from data collected 
about the individual (financial history, assets, etc.).  
The data are not necessarily owned by FICO.  
However, FICO collects the data and analyzes it to 
derive a score used by lenders and consumers for 
financing purposes.  FICO creates a “good” that the 
company owns even though FICO did not own the 
original data. 
The ATP, cooperative, or other technology provider 
creates a new use for the data after it is collected, 
analyzed, and made useful, similar to a FICO score.  
Digital data are identical to the original farm-level 
data and are considered the “property” of the farmer. 
However, once another party copies the digital data, 
the original owner has lost control, i.e. the data are no 
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Farm Data Ownership Is a Hotly Debated Topic  
To sort out some of the issues concerning ownership, 
consider what it means to “own” something.  Legally, 





 –EXCLUDE OTHERS FROM 
 –TRANSFER 
 –CONSUME or DESTROY
In the context of a tangible good like a bushel of 
grain, this definition is easy to understand.  The owner 
has the right to possess a bushel of grain produced or 
purchased and use the grain for his/her own purposes. 
The owner also has the right to exclude others from 
using the grain.  Ownership also conveys the right to 
transfer, sell, consume, or destroy the grain.  Destroying 
the grain may seem unreasonable but ownership rights 
give the owner that option.  
When considering ownership of farm and other data, 
the rights and responsibilities of the parties are less 
clear.  Farm data are not a tangible asset, like a bushel 
of grain.  Instead, ownership should be considered in 
terms of rights and responsibilities of the parties with 
access to the data.  
Broadly speaking, any confidential 
business information providing an 
individual or enterprise with a 
competitive edge may be 
considered a trade secret.
Typically, the type of property determines the associated 
rights and responsibilities. However, farm data have 
not been legally classified.  One legal argument is that 
farm data should be classified as intellectual property 
and more specifically, trade secrets.  Broadly speaking, 
any confidential business information providing an 
individual or enterprise with a competitive edge may 
be considered a trade secret.
States Follow Federal Law in Defining 
Trade Secrets
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) provides a 
legal framework to better protect trade secrets for U.S. 
companies operating in multiple states. Courts in 47 
states and the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands apply the UTSA as the trade 
secret standard to resolve conflicts regarding big farm 
data.  
As of 2016, New York, North Carolina, and 
Massachusetts continue to apply their own definitions 
and standards (Legislative Fact Sheet). 
Courts in 47 states and the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands apply the UTSA as the trade secret 
standard to resolve conflicts regarding big farm data.  
Under UTSA, a trade secret must consist of informa-
tion which:
1. Includes a formula, pattern, compilation, program, 
device, method, technique, or process;
2. Derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to or 
readily ascertainable through appropriate means by 
other persons who might obtain economic value 
from its disclosure or use; and
3. Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under 
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When applied to agricultural data, these three aspects 
of the definition help clarify how farm data can be 
considered a trade secret.  Consider the UTSA 
definition applied to growing soybeans.  
1. Is the manner and strategy in planting and 
harvesting soybeans a formula or pattern?  
Arguably, yes, they are.   
2. Does growing soybeans in this manner derive 
economic value?  
In good years, absolutely. 
Is a farmer’s specific plan for growing and raising 
soybeans, for example, by using the data from previous 
years (soil conditions, fertilizer use, irrigation practices, 
and the like) “generally not known or readily 
ascertainable” to other people in or outside of the 
industry? Possibly. In this case, farm data do not 
exactly fit the UTSA definition and the law needs 
to catch up with technology.  
However, when determining if the data are “readily
 ascertainable,” courts have recognized that where 
information is available by other means (like a phone 
book as opposed to a company’s customer list), the 
data are not protected by trade secret law (USAChem, 
1975). For example, if dairy cow genetics are available 
on a public database, the genetic data would not be 
considered a trade secret, nor protected. 
The third aspect of the trade secret definition deserves 
further consideration. Farmers, landowners, and their 
advisors are unlikely to employ reasonable efforts to 
maintain the secrecy of their data or practices. 
Consider the farmer who has grown and harvested 
the same crops on the same property for several years 
and understands a particular piece of land better than 
other people.  The farmer potentially has a good 
argument that the farm data are a trade secret, as long 
as he/she takes reasonable steps to maintain its secrecy. 
When considering if the steps taken are reasonable, 
courts look to the farmer’s actions.  This is done on 
a case-by-case basis and may depend on the data and 
the farm operation.
Consider the farmer who has grown 
and harvested the same crops on 
the same property for several years 
and understands a particular piece 
of land better than other people.  
The farmer potentially has a good 
argument that the farm data are 
a trade secret, as long as he/she 
takes reasonable steps to maintain 
its secrecy.
The question that logically follows is, “what if the 
farmer shares the data with a seed company, ATP 
provider, or cooperative?” Sharing could destroy 
“secrecy” unless participation is done anonymously via 
secure processes since actual secrecy is at the heart of 
“trade secret” protection.  So are farm data protected 
under the UTSA and considered a trade secret? The 
facts seem to weigh in favor of the farmer, but 
unfortunately until laws are created to categorize 
agricultural data, the courts will give the legal guidance.   
What Protections Does Trade Secret 
Status Allow the Owner?
Trade secret protection may give farmers with farm 
data remedies in justice and law if the farm data are 
misused through hacking or deliberate misappropriation, 
for example (Uniform Law Commission).  Any use of 
a trade secret (in this case, farm data) without 
permission from the farmer or farm data owner which 
results in disclosure of the data gives a farmer the legal 
capacity to recover damages.  In this way, trade secret 
law protects the farm data owner from disclosure or 
improper use (e.g., market manipulation for a certain 
crop or selling to third parties for land-leasing purposes). 
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Trade secret protection may give farmers with farm data 
remedies in justice and law if the farm data are misused through 
hacking or deliberate misappropriation, for example.
Several thousand farmers across the Corn Belt have 
yield monitor data streaming to an ATP or other data 
repository in near real time as a crop is being harvested. 
Although agreements stipulate otherwise, suppose the 
repository misappropriates the data by selling early 
yield estimates to commodity traders. The farmers 
may be able to recover one of the three types of damages:
1. Actual damages may include lost profits, which are 
typically calculated as net profits (meaning gross 
profits minus overhead and expenses required to 
run the business). 
2. Reasonable royalty rate is determined by con-
structing a hypothetical negotiation for licensing 
the trade secret (in this case, farm data), between 
the parties at the time misappropriation began. 
The law assumes this hypothetical negotiation oc-
curred and the farmer, who ordinarily would not 
license his trade secret to the misappropriator, did 
so willingly for a bargained-for price. 
3. Unjust enrichment seeks to return the benefits the 
misappropriator gained to the farmer. 
For a more detailed analysis of how to potentially 
calculate damages in a hypothetical case, see Griffin, 
2016 for more detail.
Several thousand farmers across 
the Corn Belt have yield monitor 
data streaming to an ATP or other 
data repository in near real time as 
a crop is being harvested.  
Actual Damages in a Farm Management 
Context Can Be Difficult to Prove 
Little quantitative evidence exists on the benefits of 
farm data to a farm operation. Farms that collect but 
never use data (for example, combine yield monitor
 data which are not downloaded at least once per 
season) further compound the issue. Unused data have 
zero value to farm operations. Not all farms successfully 
use data in farm management decision making.  Even 
farms which do use their data have a wide range of 
expected benefits. Individual farms may not expect to 
find it worthwhile to prove ‘actual damages’ or 
initially instigate a lawsuit. When data are disclosed, 
farmers’ competitive advantage with respect to local 
bargaining power may be lost (Griffin et al., 2016).  
Proving damages may not be worth it to individuals; 
however, a group of farmers may have a better chance 
at recovery considering their collective data have more 
value than individual.  If a group or cooperative of 
farmer data are misappropriated, proving actual 
collective damages may be easier due to the value 
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If a group or cooperative of farmer data are misappropriated, 
proving actual collective damages may be easier due to the 
value added for regional data, for example, versus 
individual farm data.
Reasonable Royalty: How Much Farmers 
Are Willing to Accept for Farm Data Will 
Likely Differ From How Much Data Aggre-
gators Are Willing to Pay
Again, it is going to be very difficult to prove 
reasonable royalty in a case of misappropriating a 
farmer’s data.  Economic theory suggests that the 
aggregator sees no value in a single farm’s data and 
therefore, negotiation would be equal to $0. But if 
the aggregator negotiated with all farmers collectively, 
they would arrive at some value greater than $0. 
However, there’s no ‘let’s negotiate’ button on an 
end-user license agreement (EULA), that usually 
accompanies farm data software downloads. Farmers 
have no bargaining power once the data system has 
a critical mass of farms/acreage. Farmers consistently 
place implicit value on their data, however, much like 
they do for their herd genetics. The farmer who values 
farm data positively would not accept the $0 offered 
by data aggregators.  
In the case of big farm data, the value to the 
community is greater than the sum of the individual 
member benefits. Given this ‘network effect’ where 
the value of the system is a function of the number of 
members, the aggregator enjoys much greater benefits 
than any individual or the collective group. Therefore 
the ‘reasonable royalty’ may be difficult to estimate 
given that there is only a relatively small value to 
each individual. 
We know that the value to the aggregator is greater 
than the sum of all the individual benefits; however, 
we also know that any farmer can withdraw from the 
network without causing the aggregator to lose value. 
Therein lies the problem of estimating reasonable 
royalty; the aggregator can argue that the value of data 
from any given farm is $0 to the aggregator.
Given the Network Effects of Farm Data 
Valuation, “Unjust Enrichment” Is the 
Most Likely Way for Farmers to Claim 
Damages 
The marginal value of individual farm data is very 
small but in the aggregate, the big data repository has 
an opportunity for “unjust enrichment.”  The legal 
concept refers to situations in which one entity 
(person, firm, etc.) is enriched at the expense of 
another in circumstances which the law treats as unjust.
A data aggregator benefits disproportionately 
compared to individual network members (farmers) 
who may have already captured potential farm-level 
benefits from their data.  However, aggregators may 
benefit more than the sum of all individual farmers, 
even to the point that competitive advantages of 
individual farms are lost.  In some cases, aggregators 
may receive the “unjust enrichment” as part of an 
intentional breach, at least from the farmer’s perspective. 
Farmers Should Consider Protections of 
a Well-Worded Contract or Nondisclosure 
Agreement
  
In theory, classifying farm data as trade secret 
information offers farmers legal recourse.  If the 
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however, farmers will not have the protections 
afforded by the relevant law. In that case, farmers may 
consider placing protections into contracts with their 
ATPs, cooperatives, and other service providers to 
protect their farm data. 
Until the legal framework catches up to agricultural 
technology, ensuring protection of farm data in a 
well-crafted contract is the best management practice 
to follow.  Although this list is not exhaustive, some 
issues farmers may want to consider and discuss with 
an attorney are:
1. What control will the farmer have over the data?
2. Are the data portable between computer media or 
transferable to other entities?
3. Can the farmer share the data if he/she switches 
to another ATP?
4. How will the data be aggregated and kept anony-
mous?
 a. Can the data later be deleted after use? What 
 measures are used to delete data or otherwise 
 make it unusable?
 b. Does the contract require affirmative 
 consent before data can be shared with an ATP 
 or a third party or modified?
5. Will the farmer be notified of changes to an ATP’s 
privacy policies?
6. Does the agreement prohibit an ATP from using 
data for speculation in commodities markets?
7. Can the ATP modify the data? Remember, if the 
ATP changes the data itself, the ATP can claim 
ownership, thus destroying original ownership.
8. What security measures does the ATP use to 
prevent data breaches? What internal and external 
auditing procedures are in place? 
Farmers could also consider protecting data by 
using a nondisclosure agreement (NDA).  An NDA is 
a legally enforceable contract that creates a confidential 
relationship between a person who holds some kind 
of information (the farmer) and a person/entity to 
whom the trade secret is disclosed (ATP, cooperative, 
etc.). The NDA must be executed BEFORE the 
information is disclosed. 
NDAs contain a few key elements, including:
1. Defining who is disclosing and who is receiving;
2. Defining the trade secrets in detail;
3. Excluding what is NOT protected as a trade secret 
(e.g.: publicly available information);
4. Establishing a duty to keep information secret;
5. Specifying allowed uses/prohibited uses;
6. Setting an enforcement period, usually defined by 
event rather than time;
Some additional items to consider including in a 
NDA are:
7. Data destruction requirements;
8. Injunctive relief: Rather than offering money as 
payment for misuse, injunctive relief is a court 
order for the defendant to stop a specified act or 
behavior.  For example, the court order can  
require the misappropriator to halt any further  
use of the “trade secret”;
9. Integration clause: This clause states that 
10. everything the employee and employer have 
agreed upon is contained in the NDA and no  
other agreements, oral or written, will be  
included into that specific NDA;
11. Attorney’s fees; and
12. Alternative dispute resolution which requires  
mediation first rather than court.
Farmers could also consider 
protecting data by using a 
nondisclosure agreement. An NDA 
is a legally enforceable contract that 
creates a confidential relationship 
between a person who holds some 
kind of information (the farmer) and 
a person/entity to whom the trade 
secret is disclosed.
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These considerations are not an exhaustive list for 
contracting farm data protections.  It is always a good 
idea to have a qualified attorney look over the details 
of any contract.  
Bargaining Power Within Contracts Can 
Help You Decide Where Data Are Housed
Simple economics of supply and demand may 
inevitably solve the issue of the ATP’s out-leveraging 
farms in bargaining power for farm data, at least in the 
short run.  Although initially many companies may 
compete to become the most successful farm data 
company, not all ATPs are expected to be successful in 
the long run. 
What does this mean? The relative advantage of 
farmers compared to aggregators likely will change as 
more farmers join the big data system. In the system’s 
infancy, however, there are numerous ATPs striving 
to attract farmers who currently are able to pick and 
choose which ATP to house their farm data.  Since 
many ATPs are attempting to attract farm data, these 
companies must be farmer-friendly, which means they 
must alleviate farmers’ fears with respect to data 
ownership, privacy, and security. 
Farmer perceptions of ATPs are important to their 
success.   An ATP which manufactures or sells 
products in the agricultural sector is unlikely to be 
successful in the farm data sector because farmers may 
perceive the firm as using the data to sell more 
products (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2014). 
Ultimately, any company with unfavorable 
perceptions,  does not allow farmers to retain 
ownership of farm data, or does not leave the data 
decision making up to the farmer, will likely be 
excluded from being a viable farm data ATP.  
Since many ATPs are attempting to attract farm data, these 
companies must be farmer-friendly, which means they must 
alleviate farmers’ fears with respect to data ownership, privacy, 
and security.  
Does the Data Stay With the Land or the 
Landowner? 
Another issue in the discussion of farm data is the 
ownership of the data when the land is leased and 
farmed by another individual.  There are three critical 
clauses to include in a farm lease to address ownership 
of farm data:
1. Define what the data are;
2. Stipulate early in the lease relationship who owns 
this data; and
3. Specify how and which data are shared between 
landlord and tenant and whether the farm data are 
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Clauses for land leases should be considered for the 
potential impacts on farm management (Goeringer, 
2015). These clauses can be customized to fit the 
landlord and tenant’s specific and unique needs.  The 
landlord, for example, may want data defined broadly 
to include all forms of data collected on the farm.  
The landlord and tenant should settle negotiations 
before the lease begins.  Regardless of whether the 
landlord or tenant will own the data during the 
duration of the lease, landowners are likely to pay 
close attention to the third clause in the list above to 
ensure the data ultimately stay with the land for future 
use and negotiations.   
In the negotiating process, however, the landowner 
likely has incentive to provide the current 
farmer-tenant access to the data. This does not 
directly imply that the data should ‘belong’ to the land 
rather than the current landowner, but that opportunity
for negotiation exists regarding transferring data 
between parties. However, economic theory suggests 
that in the long run, the value of farm data will be 
built into farmland values. For the same reasons, farm 
data are also expected to stay with the land. 
AREC | January 2017
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